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Abstract
Most of the existing literature on the current pandemic focuses on approaches to model the
outbreak and spreading of COVID-19. This paper proposes a generalized Markov-Switching ap-
proach, the SUIHR model, designed to study border control policies and contact tracing against
COVID-19 in a period where countries start to re-open. We offer the following contributions. First,
the SUIHR model can include multiple entities, reflecting different government bodies with dif-
ferent containment measures. Second, constraints as, for example, new case targets and medical
resource limits can be imposed in a linear programming framework. Third, in contrast to most SIR
models, we focus on the spreading of infectious people without symptoms instead of the spreading
of people who are already showing symptoms. We find that even if a country has closed its bor-
ders completely, domestic contact tracing is not enough to go back to normal life. Countries having
successfully controlled the virus can keep it under check as long as imported risk is not growing,
meaning they can lift travel restrictions with similar countries. However, opening borders towards
countries with less controlled infection dynamics would require a mandatory quarantine or a strict
test on arrival.
Despite the initial panic and chaos, most countries of the world have withstood the first wave of
COVID-19. To ”bend the curve” of the virus spreading, authorities closed their borders, put stay-at-
home orders in place and introduced several measures of social distancing. Recently, authorities in
many countries and territories have started the phase of reopening to recover their economy. After
opening restaurants and retail stores again, when and how to reopen the borders has become a heated
topic. While there is little doubt that travel and tourism contribute greatly to the economy (Manzo,
2019), reopening the border in an unstructured manner is likely to result in a spike of cases and new
lockdown orders.
This paper proposes a new approach to study border control policies against COVID-19, or any
other pandemic, during the re-opening phase. This is especially important in view of the new in-
creases of infection numbers currently appearing worldwide. Our model can be seen as a generaliza-
tion and extension to the SIR model that was first proposed by Kermack and McKendrick (1927). SIR
∗The opinions in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of oneworld Management
Company, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, or American Airlines.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
13
56
1v
2 
 [q
-b
io.
PE
]  
1 S
ep
 20
20
and SEIR models are Markov transition models that have long been used to model epidemic spread-
ing and controls such as lockdowns and vaccines; see Hethcote (2000); or, for recent applications
Peng et al. (2020), Prem et al. (2020) or Maier and Brockmann (2020). The approach we introduce is
in discrete time and can be described as S(usceptible) U(nidentified infectious) I(dentified infectious)
H(ospitalized) R(ecovered) model.
The model extensions have several dimensions. First, the SUIHR model can include multiple
entities, reflecting different government bodies with different containment measures. We explicitly
model the importation of infected individuals from one entity to another so that the effect of border
control policies can be studied. Second, in contrast to most SIR models, we focus on the spreading
of infectious people without symptoms instead of the spreading of people who are already showing
symptoms. This is to account for the new characteristics of the re-opening phase compared to the
initial outbreak control phase. The danger of COVID-19 is now well known and people have the
awareness to avoid spreading once they are identified as infected. Testing is largely available, most
people who show symptoms can get a diagnose quickly and will be isolated. Third, contact trac-
ing, a promising technology that many countries have recently introduced, is built into our model.
During the re-opening phase, ”trace & isolate” should be the main method to reduce the spreading
of the virus - again, with the focus on avoiding spreading through potentially infected individuals
which are not yet showing symptoms. Fourth, unlike the outbreak control phase, in which swift
lockdown actions needed to be taken at all costs to prevent overwhelming the healthcare systems,
the re-opening phase is likely to be more strategic. Therefore, constraints such as new case targets
and medical resources are incorporated into the model framework as part of the policy optimization
process. Solutions to our model can be obtained via linear programming.
For our empirical analysis, a central element is that strategies against corona vary strongly across
countries. Therefore, we classify government entities in the world into three major groups based
on their control strategies. Group 1 entities were able to completely eliminate domestic new cases
and then started to re-open. Examples of Group 1 entities are mainland China, Hong Kong and
New Zealand. Group 2 entities are those which have successfully controlled the virus (i.e., the new
cases are steadily decreasing for a long time and only a small portion of the total population has
been infected) and have started to re-open before the virus was completely eliminated. Most of the
Europe Union countries belong to this group. Group 2 countries need to keep COVID-19 under check
until effective vaccines are developed. Group 3 entities are those aiming for herd immunity either
strategically or involuntarily. Examples are Sweden, Brazil and the US.
Our study offers two main findings. First, even if a country has closed its borders completely,
domestic contact tracing is not enough to go back to normal life. However, contact tracing can re-
duce the reproduction rate from 2.8 to about 1.3 and hence can be of great help in relaxing conven-
tional containment measures. Economically, this is of crucial importance because large parts of the
observed labor market slump can be traced back to these measures (e.g. Bauer and Weber, 2020).
Second, group 2 countries are able to keep COVID-19 under control, as long as the imported risk
is not growing over time. This implies they can open up their borders towards group 1 and other
group 2 countries without a mandatory quarantine or test on arrival. For group 2 countries to open
to group 3 countries, a strict test at border is needed to sufficiently limit the imported risk, i.e. to
prevent imported cases from growing over time. In absence of such a test, a mandatory quarantine
on arrival is needed.
The literature on mathematical and statistical models for COVID-19 is growing fast. Several ex-
tensions to the standard SIR model have been proposed. Optimal policies facing the trade-off be-
tween health and economic damage have been studied in Eichenbaum et al. (2020), Alvarez et al.
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(2020) and Jones et al. (2020). It has been confirmed that social distancing and lockdowns were suc-
cessful in bringing down the number of new infections, see e.g. Prem et al. (2020), Radulescu and
Cavanagh (2020), Dehning et al. (2020), Ju¨ni et al. (2020) and Weber (2020). The effectiveness of
”smarter”, economically less harmful, measures has been studied as well; for example, face masks
are analyzed in Lyu and Wehby (2020) and Mitze et al. (2020), group specific approaches (e.g. stricter
social distancing rules for vulnerable groups) and contact tracing are investigated in Acemoglu et al.
(2020) and Grimm et al. (2020). Models with group specific parameters and policies are most closely
related to our approach. However, we propose a model to optimize a multi-entity problem where
each country applies uniform policies. A border between countries that effectively separates one
uniform policy from another is what we have observed during the last six months of the world-wide
corona pandemic.
The effectiveness of border closures and controls is supported by the academic literature, partic-
ularly with respect to reducing the number of imported individuals, which are infected but asymp-
tomatic; see Wells et al. (2020) and Lee et al. (2020). In this regard, the effectiveness of border closures
can also depend on further containment measures considered in combination (see e.g. Deb et al.,
2020, Weber, 2020, Chinazzi et al., 2020 and Nussbaumer-Streit et al., 2020). Chinazzi et al. (2020)
used the global epidemic and mobility model (GLEaM) to confirm that international travel restric-
tions helped to slow down the spreading of COVID-19. The GLEaM, a combination of the SIR model
and a network model, is particularly designed to simulate the outbreak and global spreading of an
epidemic through airline traffic.
Similarly, the effectiveness of contact tracing is generally supported, too, see e.g. Fraser et al.
(2004). Grimm et al. (2020) show that a combination of targeted policies with contact tracing can
be very effective in preventing a high death toll. According to Ferretti et al. (2020), it is crucial that
contact tracing is digital to be fast enough to break infection chains. Recently, many countries (for
example France and Germany) have introduced a corona tracing app. What is still unclear to decision
makers, however, is how much can exactly be gained by contact tracing. For example, how helpful
can a tracing app be in allowing to relax conventional measures like border closures.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the SUIHR model and show analyt-
ical results. In the third section we present the simulation results. Section 4 solves a border control
problem using linear programming. Section 5 concludes.
2 The SUIHR Model: A Generalized Markov-Switching Framework with Bor-
der Controls and Contact Tracing
2.1 Markov States, Discrete Time Scale and Fundamental COVID-19 Dynamics
We define the following health states, summarized in Table 1 and graphically illustrated in Figure 1:
• Susceptible: An individual has not been infected by the virus and is susceptible to infection.
• Unidentified Infectious: An individual is infected already, but not yet identified. Also, the indi-
vidual is not aware of the infection and hence does not adjust its behavior. This state includes
people who are exposed, pre-symptomatic, and asymptomatic. In the re-opening phase, we as-
sume people who have symptoms can immediately get a test by which they will be identified.
• Identified Infectious: A person is identified as infectious. For the re-opening phase, we assume
anyone who is showing symptoms will be identified quickly.
• Hospitalized: Some fraction of the infected people need to be hospitalized.
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• Recovered: Individuals which are recovered from the virus infection and, at least for some
time, are immune to re-infection.
• Death: People who have died from the infection.
On top of the health states, we define two mobility states:
• Free: The person can move freely and hence can interact with anyone.
• Quarantined: No free movement is permitted and no spreading of virus to others is possible.
Table 1: Model States
State Descriptions
S Susceptible
UF Unidentified Infectious Free
UQ Unidentified Infectious Quarantined
I1 Identified Infectious, Stage 1 (first week only)
I2 Identified Infectious, Stage 2 (week 2 and later)
H1 Hospitalization, Stage 1 (first week only)
H2 Hospitalization Infectious, Stage 2 (week 2 and later)
R Recovered
D Death
In general, everyone in susceptible. Unidentified and identified infectious, and recovered indi-
viduals can either be free or quarantined. However, in the re-opening phase, we assume that anyone
who has been identified as infectious will be quarantined immediately to avoid virus spreading.
Hospitalized people are also automatically quarantined in our model. In contrast to the initial out-
break control phase, we do not consider block quarantine on healthy (susceptible and recovered)
people. Only a very small portion of the susceptible population are put into quarantine with contact
tracing. We will ignore the (marginal) positive effect on reducing the virus spreading from quaran-
tining healthy people. Instead, we focus on quarantining the unidentified infectious individuals. We
further split the unidentified infectious group into UF (unidentified infectious free) and UQ (uniden-
tified infectious quarantined).
The model we propose is in discrete time. Without loss of generality, we define each time epoch
to be one week. This is mainly motivated by the fact that any policy that lasts less than one week
is too short and unstable to be executed in practice. Also 7-day averages are commonly used to
measure COVID-19 statistics. SIR and SEIR models are Markov models, in which a fix percentage
of the cohort from each state transits to another state in each time epoch. The transition is assumed
to be memoryless and for a given cohort in any state, the time of staying in that state before leaving
it follows an exponential distribution (or a geometric distribution for discrete time models). Hence,
the percentage of a cohort leaving a state is decreasing over time. However, the existing evidence
on COVID-19, as summarized in Figure 2, is in contrast to the decreasing transition probabilities, see
Lechien et al. (2020); Zhou et al. (2020); To et al. (2020). For example, it has been clinically observed
that only 25% of the hospitalized patients are discharged within the first week, while 50% are dis-
charged during the second week (Zhou et al., 2020). Therefore, a different distributional assumption
is made.
As shown in Figure 3, for some states, the time needed to transition out of that state follows a
distribution whose peak comes at time epoch t = m > 1, i.e. the probability of leaving a state is
increasing for some time and only decreasing after the m − th epoch. For the ”head” part before
the m− th epoch, we build exactly m− 1 transient sub-states, which all belong to the same physical
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Figure 1: Transitional Diagram
Figure 2: COVID-19 Dynamics with Median Transition Time
state. Agents in those sub-states must transit to a different state or to the next sub-state at each time
epoch. For the ”tail” part (i.e. t ≥ m), we introduce a single sub-state, which can be represented
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using a geometric distribution. Overall, a total of m sub-states from the same state are created. Using
the previous example of COVID-19 hospitalization time. Most of the patients are discharged in the
second week, hence for state H, m = 2, two sub-states H1 and H2 are created, in which H1 is a
transient state for week 1 only. H2 represents hospital stays from week 2 and after.
Figure 3: Use exponential distribution for tail approximation
In the SUIHR model, we have two transient sub-states of Identified Infectious (i.e., I1 and I2) and
two sub-states of Hospitalization (i.e., H1 and H2). I1 and H1 correspond to weekly new cases and
weekly new hospital admission, respectively. The new case number is the most closely monitored
statistic that decision makers rely on.
2.2 Model Parameters
We denote t ∈ [t0, t1, ...., T] to be the time epochs in which we consider implementing a policy strat-
egy. We assume at time epoch T, vaccine will be available and broadly used.
The entity has a population of C, assuming no net immigration, the entity has xt people traveling
into the entity at time t and the same amount of people leaving the entity. We use NS, NUF , ...
to denote the number of people in each states. We denote φ ∈ Φ to be a specific control policy
combination in a set of all possible controls. An example of a control policy φ is no gathering of more
than 5 people and the requirement of face masks in public areas. We assume under policy φ every
infectious person in the UF state on average has close contact to σφ people in a time epoch given
the social distance practice. We refer to the probability of infection with close contact by γφ. Given
that NS/C percent of the population is susceptible, σφ · γφ · NS/C will become infected. Factors that
impact σ are, for example, population density, social distancing and stay home orders. Factors that
impact γ are, for example, wearing face masks and proper disinfection such as hand washing.
Naturally, σ and γ are difficult to observe in practice. The parameter r = σ · γ stands for the
expected number of people an infectious person can spread the virus to in a time epoch given a
life style, i.e. given a specific containment policy. Note that here r is slightly different from the
base reproduction number (commonly denoted by R0) or effective reproduction number Rt popular
in literature. For each entity, base reproduction number R0 is a constant that only depends on the
nature of the virus. Effective reproduction number Rt, is calculated as ratio of the new cases in time
epoch t versus the previous time epoch. Rt is an observed outcome which depends on the domestic
containment policy, represented by r, and other control mechanism such as contact tracing.
Pji is the probability that an individual transits from health state i into state j at each time epoch,
where i, j ∈ {S,U, I1, I2, H1, H2, R, D}. Note the transition of health state is independent of the mo-
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bility state. Therefore, UF and UQ share the same transitional probability.
We summarize the parameters in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameter Definition
Parameter Definition
t Index for time epoch
φ A given control policy, φ ∈ Φ
C Population of the entity of interest
xt Directional traffic that enter/leave the entity at time t
σφ Average number of people a person have close contact with under policy φ
γφ Probability of spreading the virus after close contact under policy φ
rφ rφ = σφ · γφ
θ Percentage of close contacts that can be traced and quarantined
β Percentage of incoming travelers that will go through 14-day quarantine
Ni Number of people in State i
Pji Probability of transition from state i to j
2.3 Imported Risk
Consider an entity controls the traffic into its own territory, assuming a screening policy can effec-
tively stop all the symptomatic individuals. Therefore, only people in state UF (i.e., unidentified
infectious and free to move) can travel, and no identified infectious people (i.e., people in UI) should
be allowed to enter without being quarantined. We do not take into account people that commute
daily across the border to work, since daily commuters should not be considered as external. We
assume people who travel outside the entity and return later would bare the same risk of being
infectious as people with foreign origins.
Due to the screening, only a small percentage α of travelers are infectious. We assume all of those
people are still UF upon arrival and hence can potentially spread the virus into the population of
the entity of arrival. Also, people could potentially get infected during the trip and hence some may
depart as S from the origin entity but arrive as UF.
We denote xkt to be the traffic coming in from origin k at time epoch t, and we use αk to denote the
percentage of unidentified infectious people from origin k. Note that k can be from any other entity
with any means of transportation. For example, people coming into Germany from France by air
and by land can be modeled as separate origins with a different risk level αk. By x0 it is referred to
the number of people leaving the entity of interest, and α0 is the percentage of people in UI who are
leaving.
It is assumed that there is a quarantine policy after travel and a certain percentage of travelers β
will actually be sent to quarantine while the rest will enter the free state. A very strict mandatory
quarantine will have β = 1. A stay home quarantine would be less effective with β < 1. A no
quarantine policy would be represented by β = 0.
2.4 Contact Tracing
We explicitly model contact tracing. When someone is identified as infectious, contact tracing will
reveal a percentage of the people the newly identified person has contacted. Those people will be
quarantined. Formally, if someone is identified, θ percent of the σ people who had close contact with
the identified I1 person will be put into quarantine. The newly infected individuals are given by
σ · γ · θ · NS/C = r · θ · NS/C.
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2.5 SUIHRModel Equations and Analytical Results
With the parameter defined, we can formally write down the dynamic equations in our model. We
first consider only domestic cases only and assume there are no imported cases. We start assuming
the control policy is given.
NSt+1 = N
S
t − NUFt · r · NSt /C (1)
NUFt+1 = P
U
U · NUFt + NUFt · r · NSt /C− PI1U · NUFt · r · NSt /C · θ +∑
k
αk · xkt · (1− β)− α0 · x0t (2)
N
UQ
t+1 = P
U
U · N
UQ
t + P
I1
U · NUFt · r · NSt /C · θ +∑
k
αk · xkt · β (3)
N I1t+1 = P
I1
U · NUFt + PI1U · N
UQ
t (4)
N I2t+1 = P
I2
I2
· N I2t + PI2I1 · N
I1
t (5)
NH1t+1 = P
H1
I1
· N I1t + PH1I2 · N
I2
t (6)
NH2t+1 = P
H2
H2
· NH2t + PH2H1 · N
H1
t (7)
NRt+1 = N
R
t + P
R
U · (NUFt + N
UQ
t ) + P
R
I1 · N
I1
t + P
R
I2 · N
I2
t + P
R
H1 · N
H1
t + P
R
H2 · N
H2
t (8)
NDt+1 = N
D
t + P
D
H1 · N
H1
t + P
D
H2 · N
H2
t (9)
Note the term PI1U · NUFt · r · NSt /C · θ in Equation (2) and (3) represent the infected people sent to
quarantine by contact tracing. Here PI1U · NUFt are the newly discovered cases in time t+ 1. As soon
as the new cases are discovered, PI1U · NUFt · σ · θ people are quarantined, among which γ · NSt /C are
actually infected.
We denote yt = ∑k αk · xkt · (1− β) − α0 · x0t to be the total net imported infectious cases. Tech-
nically y can be negative as more infectious people are leaving the entity than entering. However,
any rational policy maker should not rely on exporting their problems to others, rather they should
manage the imported risk as in the worst case scenario where they only have imported cases and
export no infectious to other entities. Therefore we can assume yt ≥ 0.
As mentioned earlier, in the re-opening phase, only people in UF can spread the virus. Therefore,
when NUF is non-increasing over time, the virus spreading is under control.
NUFt+1 = P
U
U · NUFt + NUFt · r · NSt /C− PI1U · NUFt · r · NSt /C · θ + yt
= {PUU + (1− PI1U · θ) · r · Nst /C} · NUFt + yt
LetRt = PUU +(1− PI1U · θ) · r ·Nst /C, this is the effective domestic reproduction rate at time epoch
t without any imported cases. When Rt ≤ 1, the spread is contained domestically when the border
is closed or anyone coming in are subject to mandatory quarantine.
It is easy to see that ∂Rt∂θ = −PI1U · r · Nst /C < 0. This means the reproduction rate is decreasing
as the effectiveness of contact tracing θ increases. Hence, any level of contact tracing is beneficial in
terms of containing the virus spreading.
It is also easy to see that ∂Rt
∂PUU
> 0. This means if the infectious incubation period is long, it makes
containing the virus more difficult, which makes perfect sense in reality.
Another thing worth mentioning is that the term Nts/C here in general represents the effect of
herd immunity. When evaluating policies, we need to consider the worst case scenario that Nts/C ≈
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1. Therefore, we denote Rˆ = PUU + (1 − PI1U · θ) · r, when Rˆ ≤ 1, we consider the control policy
working without the need to rely on herd immunity over time.
Grouping Countries Strategies against corona vary strongly across countries. Decision makers
need to decide if risk associated with opening up the borders to other countries is consistent with
domestic policy targets. For example, government entities will need to evaluate the need for a 14
days mandatory quarantine upon arrival, which will eliminate imported risk but at the same time
eliminate almost all travel demand. Less aggressive alternatives such as semi-mandatory stay home
quarantine upon arrival and contact tracing to contain the imported risk must be evaluated as well.
Also, if an entity decides to open up, how much traffic from different sources should it take as time
progresses before the vaccine is available? We classify government entities in the world into three
major groups based on their control strategies. Mathematically, Group 1 entities have NUF0 = 0
and Rˆ > 1; Group 2 entities have NUF0 > 0 and Rˆ < 1, and Group 3 entities have NUF0 > 0 and
Rˆ > 1. Less formally, Group 1 entities were able to completely eliminate domestic new cases and
then started to re-open. Examples of Group 1 entities are mainland China, Hong Kong and New
Zealand. These countries are currently opening-up and push back domestic life to the pre-pandemic
”normal”. Group 2 entities are those which have successfully ”bent” the curve and have started to re-
open before the virus was completely eliminated. Most of the Europe Union countries belong to this
group. Group 2 countries need to keep a relatively tight control (e.g., no large crowd gathering for
sport events, limited number of customers in shops) to keep COVID-19 under check until effective
vaccines are developed. Group 3 entities are those aiming for herd immunity either strategically or
involuntarily. Examples are Sweden, Brazil and the US.
Analytical Results
Lemma 2.1. There exists some r, above which even perfect contact tracing (i.e., θ = 1) alone is not enough to
contain the spreading, i.e., Rˆ > 1.
Proof. By definition we have Rˆ = PUU + (1 − PI1U · θ) · r. Because PI1U < 1 and θ ≤ 1, we have
1− PI1U · θ > 0. That means when
r >
1− PUU
1− PI1U · θ
(10)
Rˆ > 1, and when r > 1−PUU
1−PI1U
, Rˆ > 1 for any θ.
In reality, PUU is estimated to be around 0.25 and P
I1
U about 0.6. This means if r > 1.875, then Rˆ > 1
even with perfect contact tracing. Consistent with existing estimates, we assume that when the virus
first broke out, R0 ≈ 2.8, which is equivalent to r = 2.1 without any interventions. This means
even perfect contact tracing cannot contain the virus outbreak by itself. Lemma1 also means, Group
1 countries won’t be able to control the imported case from spreading domestically with contact
tracing alone. Hence, mandatory quarantine upon arrival is needed for people in Group 1 countries
to enjoy normal life.
Lemma 2.2. If the total net imported cases are non-increasing, and the entity has employed a control policy
that the domestic reproduction rate is less than 1 (i.e., Rˆ < 1) without the imported cases. Then the total new
cases will eventually decrease at some point even without the help of herd immunity.
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Proof. We know that NUFt+1 = Rˆ · NUFt + yt without considering herd immunity overt time, therefore
we have NUFt+1 − NUFt = Rˆ · (NUFt − NUFt−1) + (yt − yt−1). Since yt is non-increasing, we have yt −
yt−1 ≤ 0. Therefore we have
NUFt+1 − NUFt ≤ Rˆ · (NUFt − NUFt−1) ≤ (Rˆ)t−ts · (NUFts+1 − N
UF
ts ) (11)
If there exists a ts such that N
UF
ts+1 ≤ N
UF
ts , then N
UF
t+1 ≤ NUFt holds for all t > ts. On the other
hand,
NUFt+1 − NUFt = yt − (1− Rˆ) · NUFt (12)
We know Rˆ < 1, therefore when NUFt ≥ yt(1−Rˆ) , N
UF
ts+1 ≤ N
UF
ts . Since
yt
(1−Rˆ) is a finite positive number,
this means the spreading will be contained even without the herd immunity.
Lemma 2 shows that Group 2 countries, with their relative strict internal control, are able to keep
the curve flattened without the need of herd immunity, so long as the imported risk is not growing
over time. Assume that xkt grows proportionally to the number of infectious free people from the
origin entities, it is possible for Group 2 entities to open borders towards Group 1 (i.e., xt = 0 because
no infectious people in the Group 1 entities) and other Group 2 countries (i.e., xt decrease over time
due to the decreasing of infectious cohort in the origin entities) without a mandatory quarantine and
to keep the virus spreading in check. For Group 2 countries to open to Group 3 countries, since
the total number of infectious people in Group 3 countries are increasing over time (before herd
immunity is achieved), the imported risk from Group 3 countries is also increasing over time. This
means either there exists a strict test at border, which can limit the number of UI people that sneak
in under the radar at any t to a constant, or a mandatory quarantine on arrival is then needed to
prevent virus spreading growing out of control.
3 Data Characteristics and Simulation Results
After explaining our parameter calibration, we address a baseline for a single entity and border
control for group 2 entities.
3.1 Parameter Description
In this section, we will demonstrate some important results using simulation. We acknowledge that
the literature regarding COVID-19 is constantly developing and hence the parameters used in this
paper are subject to change as better knowledge regarding the virus is available. However, the qual-
itative interpretation of the results in this paper would be applicable even the parameters differ.
We calibrate the model based on parameter values taken from the existing literature. For the
transitional probability matrix, we use the following parameter set.
• PUU = 0.25, PI1U = 0.6 and PRU = 0.15. This set of parameter means that 80% of the infected
people will eventually show symptom with 60% of them showing the symptom in the first
week (Lauer et al., 2020). Also 20% of the infected will be asymptomatic throughout the course
of infection, this is in line with the findings in Streeck et al. (2020).
• PI2I1 = 0.718, P
H1
I1
= 0.095 and PRI1 = 0.187; P
I2
I2
= 0.270, PH1I2 = 0.096 and P
R
I1
= 0.634. According
to Lechien et al. (2020), the mean duration of COVID-19 symptoms of mild-to-moderate cured
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(a) Weekly New Cases (b) Weekly Hospitalization
Figure 4: COVID-19 Progression with Different r
patients was 11.5 ± 5.7 days. Assuming normal distribution, we estimate 21% of the symp-
tomatic cases can recover with in 7 days. Among patients who developed severe disease, the
medium time to dyspnoea from the onset of illness or symptoms ranged from 5 to 8 days (Cen-
ters of Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). Zhou et al. (2020) also reported the median time
from illness onset to dyspnoea is 7 days with the first quarter quantile to be 4 days and third
quantile to be 9 days (i.e., IQR being 4 to 9 days). Furthermore, 19% of the total symptomatic
cases are severe to critical and would require hospitalization (Li et al., 2020).
• PH2H1 = 0.700, PRH1 = 0.250 and PDH1 = 0.050; P
H2
H2
= 0.130, PRH2 = 0.770 and P
D
H2
= 0.100.
The median hospital length of stay is 11 days with IQR being 7 to 14 (Zhou et al., 2020). The
overall fatality rate here is 2.5% for symptomatic cases, which is well within the range of various
studies (To et al., 2020).
Without loss of generality, we choose our entity in simulation to have a population of 80 million
people. This is similar in population size as the country of Germany. We warm start the system so
that the states at time epoch 0 NUF = 3600 and N I1 = 2543. This can be interpreted as an average
of 363 new cases are observed everyday in the entity with a total of 3600 unidentified cases in the
starting week.
3.2 Simulation Results For Domestic Controls
3.2.1 Single Entity Baseline
To set the baseline for understanding the simulation result, first we take a look at a single entity
that has been completely shut its border. The entity just came out of lock down and starts to relax
its internal control. As mentioned in the previous section, r being the average number of people a
free infected person can spread the virus to, can be used to measure the tightness of the domestic
control. As shown in Figure 4, the higher r is, the more relax the domestic control policy is. Figure
5 demonstrates the relationship between r and the effective reproduction rate Rt. When no contract
tracing is employed, r > 0.75 will result in the effective reproduction rate Rt > 1, hence the situation
will go out of control again. Millions of people will be infected in a single week at peak and hospital
beds will run out easily.
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Figure 5: The Relationship between Effective Reproduction Rate and r
During the lockdown, many entities, such as Germany, were able to achieve effective reproduc-
tion rate around 0.8 (i.e., r = 0.6 during the lockdown). In a normal life, r is likely to be between
2 and 3. Therefore, to avoid another outbreak, people must endure a restrained lifestyle. However,
with contact tracing, it is possible to alleviate the restrictions. As shown in Figure 6 and 7, with good
tracing, we can allow life going back to r = 1.4 whereas without it, the situation will be out of control
very quickly.
(a) Weekly New Cases (b) Weekly Hospitalization
Figure 6: Effectiveness of Contact Tracing
Given countries value domestic life higher than trans-border traveling, entities should first find
the suitable domestic control policy with the level of contact tracing to achieve a steady state that
keeps the virus contained. Only after that, should travel restriction be relaxed. Here, we simulate
three different quarantine policies. As stated in the previous section, when a mandatory centralized
quarantine is imposed, β = 1. In the other two cases, β = 0 means no quarantine upon arrival, while
β = 0.6 represents a stay home quarantine policy that is not strictly enforced. For this simulation, we
assume the entity can achieve 50% effectiveness in contact tracing (i.e., θ = 0.5) and in order to avoid
12
Figure 7: Contact Tracing Reproduction Rate Dynamics
another lockdown, the domestic control is relaxed to r = 1. We further assume an average of 1000
unidentified cases (based on 1 million weekly incoming travelers, and 0.1% being infected) can pass
the border undetected every week.
(a) Weekly New Cases (b) Weekly Hospitalization
Figure 8: Effectiveness of Quarantine on Arrival
As shown in Figure 8, without mandatory quarantine upon arrival, both new cases and hospi-
talized patients will increase overtime. However, as shown in Lemma 2, despite the increase, the
number of new cases will stabilize over time and total number of hospitalized patients are less than
5000, which is a manageable cohort size. This shows that when good internal control is present,
opening the border brings in controllable risk as long as the imported cases are not increasing over
time.
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3.2.2 Border Control for Group 2 Entities
As stated earlier, for Group 1 countries, strict mandatory quarantine is necessary to avoid another
lockdown. Therefore, travel demand to Group 1 countries would be suppressed mostly due to the
quarantine requirement. Also cross border travel would be limited by the available quarantine fa-
cilities. We are more interested in the options of Group 2 entities here. First, we study the exchange
between two Group 2 entities. In this simulation, Entity 1 has the same population size and starting
profile as the entity used in the previous single entity simulation. We keep rEnt1 = 1.4 and θEnt1 = 0.8
for Entity 1. The effective reproduction rate RˆEnt1 < 1, but very close to 1. The initial starting value
for this simulation has been warmed up assuming contact tracing has been implemented for at least
a month before the border opening. A second entity (i.e. Entity 2) is added to the simulation. Entity
2 has 50 million population, and rEnt2 = 1.1 and θEnt2 = 0.6, so Entity 2 is also a Group 2 entity with
RˆEnt2 < 1. We assume 2% of the unidentified infectious people (i.e., 3280 for Entity 1 and 4885 for
Entity 2 initially) would travel at each time epoch. This would provide about 10 to 20 daily imported
cases to each entity initially. To put this number into perspective, according to IATA traffic data, in
2019, Germany had 81 million passengers flown out of Germany for international trips (The Interna-
tional Air Transport Association, 2020). This is equivalent to 1.56 million per week, hence a little less
than 2% of the total population travel each week. We assume unidentified infectious people have the
same probability of traveling as the general population. Therefore, 2% would be applicable toward
the UF cohort. We further acknowledge the possibility of infection on the trip, hence in one of the
settings, we double the infectious people during the trip to test the effect of infection during a trip
(i.e., for every infectious person leaving one entity, there will be 2 infectious people arriving at the
other entity). This is equivalent of saying the effective reproduction rate during the trip is 2. This
should be a relatively high number given the safety measures in place today. Moreover, we assume
no quarantine upon arrival is needed. The coefficients we use in this simulation may deviate from
reality. However, such setting would serve the purpose of demonstrating the qualitative results.
As shown in Figure 9, despite being worse than the case of having a travel ban, both Entity 1 and
Entity 2 keep the new cases under control and decrease together. This is the case, even when there is
infection happening during the trip and the infectious cases would double. It is worth noting that,
when there is no infection during the trip, one of the entities could be a net exporter of infectious
people, while the other one would be a net importer. For the net exporter (i.e., Entity 1 in our sim-
ulation at the beginning and Entity 2 towards the end), the situation would improve compared to
closing borders. However, when there is infection on the road, both entities can end up being net
importer of infectious cases.
We have shown that it is possible to allow travel between two Group 2 entities without quarantine
requirement and still maintain decreasing new cases in both entities over time. We cannot, however,
make the same conclusion for a Group 2 entity to open its border to a Group 3 entity. To illustrate this,
we assume Entity 2 now does not have contact tracing. Therefore, with r = 1.1, RˆEnt2 = 1.35, and
Entity 2 is in Group 3. We further assume no additional infection happen during travel. Even then, as
shown in Figure 10, without strict border control, Entity 1 would experience another outbreak from
imported cases. The number of patients in hospital at peak time would be over 100 thousand, which
will overwhelm the health system.
We further examine if quarantine upon arrival is enough for Entity 1 (Group 2), to accept trav-
elers from Entity 2 (Group 3), without overwhelming its own system. From Figure 11 we can see
that a less strict stay home quarantine upon arrival policy may not be enough to contain the situ-
ation. Mandatory quarantine is needed for travelers from Group 3 entities. Even with mandatory
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(a) Weekly New Cases for Entity 1 (b) Weekly Hospitalization for Entity 1
(c) Weekly New Cases for Entity 2 (d) Weekly Hospitalization for Entity 2
Figure 9: Interaction between two Group 2 Entities
(a) Weekly New Cases (b) Weekly Hospitalization
Figure 10: Interaction between Group 2 and Group 3 Entities
quarantine, the weekly new cases would increase 10 folds at peak for Entity 2 comparing with its
initial weekly new cases. An alternative to mandatory quarantine would be having screening at the
border. That might be given by showing proofs of RNA/anti-body test results before embarking on
flights or trains. The test procedure would need to be sufficiently reliable, and potentially repeated
testing would be necessary in order to avoid wrong negative results in an early stage after infection.
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(a) Weekly New Cases (b) Weekly Hospitalization
Figure 11: Quarantine upon Arrival for Travelers from Group 3 Entities
While the screening could have a certain failure rate, it would have to cap the potential number of
imported cases at a constant level.
4 Solving Optimal Border Control Problem for Group 2 Entities Using Linear
Programming
We now consider a risk management problem for the policy maker in a Group 2 entity of interest. We
are not going to consider the herd immunity approach in the re-opening and allowing imported risk.
Therefore, the number of sick people is a small portion of the population. In that case we assume
NS/C ≈ 1. (If 10% of the population is immune from the first wave, we can assume NS/C ≈ 0.9.
However, as policy maker, a more conservative estimation is preferred, hence we will assume every-
one in the entity are still susceptible). Under that assumption we can further assume the net traffic
of susceptible people from traveling is 0. Hence, we are only focusing on the imported unidentified
infectious people into the system.
Practically, opening border should only be considered after the entity’s internal control policy
has been established for the re-opening phase. In other words, the entity has found its optimal re-
opening policy with Rˆ < 1 and plans to hold it until vaccine is found (and any further relaxation on
internal control will result in Rˆ > 1).
Based on the practical assumptions above, we are now trying to determine the optimal level of
incoming traffic xtj so that the entity’s internal control targets are met. These control targets can
be, but not limited to, the number of new cases staying under certain level, number of patients
hospitalized not exceeding certain capacity limit, and etc.
4.1 The Linear Programming Model
With the assumptions above, we can rewrite the dynamic equations (1) - (9) using the following
linear dynamic system equations.
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
Nt+1S
Nt+1UF
Nt+1UQ
Nt+1I1
Nt+1I2
Nt+1H1
Nt+1H2
Nt+1R
Nt+1D

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nt+1
=

1 −r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 PUU + (1− PI1U · θ) · r 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 PI1U · θ · r PUU 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 PI1U P
I1
U 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 PI2I1 P
I2
I2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 PH1I1 P
H1
I2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 PH2H1 P
H2
H2
0 0
0 PRU P
R
U P
R
I1
PRI2 P
R
H1
PRH2 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 PDH1 P
D
H2
0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A

NtS
NtUF
NtUQ
NtI1
NtI2
NtH1
NtH2
NtR
NtD

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nt
+

0 0 . . . 0
−α0 α1 · (1− β) . . . αj · (1− β)
0 α1 · β . . . αj · β
0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0
0 0 . . . 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

xt0
xt1
...
xtj

︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt
(13)
For simplicity, the equations above can be written as:
Nt+1 = ANt + Bxt (14)
and we have
Nt = (A)tN0 + (A)t−1Bx0 + (A)t−2Bx1 + · · ·+ Bxt−1 (15)
For the objective function, it is common to use economic measures. For example,
Gt =∑
j
wjxtj (16)
Here Gt is the total economic gain of bringing in xj traveler from source j at time epoch t. wj is the
marginal economical value of one traveler from source j.
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Also consider the cost of treating one person in UI to be cI and person in hospital to be cH . where
c =

0
0
0
cI
cI
cH
cH
0
0

(17)
The objective function can be written as
min
xt
T
∑
t
(c′Nt − w′xt) (18)
The objective function above can be turned into a linear programming problem with respect to
xt.
This is because
c′Nt − w′xt = c′(1+A+A2 + · · ·+At)N0
+ [c′(1+A+A2 + · · ·+At−1)B − w′]x0
+ [c′(1+A+A2 + · · ·+At−2)B − w′]x1
+ · · ·+ (c′B − w′)xt−1 − w′xt (19)
Constraints can be
NtI1 ≤ L (20)
NtH1 + N
t
H2 ≤ M (21)
for all t. The first constraint is to contain the new cases under a target level L, and the second is to
make sure the hospitalized patients are under the medical capacity M. The major benefit is that this
is an easily solvable linear problem - not a complex combinatorial problem.
4.2 Numerical Result for LP model
For this numerical study, we assume the entity of interest has r = 1.4 and good contact tracing
(θ = 0.8). We consider only two sources of imported cases in this numerical study for illustration
purposes. Both sources have weekly maximum travel demand of 1 million people. Origin 1 is of
lower risk. On average 0.1% of the traveler from Origin 1 can enter the border undetected. Origin
2 is of higher risk, with 0.3% of the travelers may enter undetected. Assume the entity government
wants to keep the weekly new cases under 5000 and the number of hospitalized patients under 1500
in any time epoch. Due to the lack of real cost information and GDP impact coefficient (i.e., c and w)
in the objective function (19), we are simply going to maximize the total number of travelers allowed.
Note this simplification provides the same solution (i.e., xt) as the original problem when the cost of
treating corona patients are smaller than the economic impact of shutting down the border.
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(a) Allowed Capacity from Origin 1 (b) Allowed Capacity from Origin 2
(c) New Cases in the Entity of Study (d) Hospitalized Patients in the Entity of Study
Figure 12: Solution from the LP model for Border Control
As shown in Figure 12 (d), our travel capacity is limited by the hospital resources. We can see
when the capacity is constrained, Origin 1 with lower imported risk is preferred over the higher risk
Origin 2. Another interesting observation is that the optimal policy is ”zig-zagging” as shown in
Figure 12 (a). This means the optimal policy would actually be a series of open-close cycles until the
hospital constraint is reached. Such open-close cycle will re-appear before the vaccine is available
at time epoch T. Note that the increase in travel allowance at the end of the time period is due to
vaccine being available at time epoch T.
The open-close policy is problematic in implementation and confusing for travelers who usually
plan ahead. Therefore, we introduce a set of smoothing constraints:
xt ≤ xt+1 (22)
for all t < T. This smoothing constraint forces a gradual re-opening.
As shown in Figure 13 and 14, with the smooth constraints, the optimal policy is no longer zig-
zagging. However, this policy is less optimal in terms of maximizing the total travel capacities.
Figure 15 shows that stricter quarantine on arrival policies (i.e., larger β) will allow more travel
capacity into the entity.
Thus, there is a trade-off between general openness to travelers and quarantine restrictions for
those actually traveling. Practical policies will have to take into account that travel demand is likely
to be reduced by stricter quarantine requirements.
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(a) Allowed Capacity from Origin 1 (b) Allowed Capacity from Origin 2
Figure 13: Solution from the LP model for Border Control with Smoothing Constraints
(a) Weekly New Cases (b) Weekly Hospitalization
Figure 14: With Smooth Constraints vs No Smooth Constraints
(a) Allowed Capacity from Origin 1 (b) Allowed Capacity from Origin 2
Figure 15: Quarantine Policy on the Travel Capacity
5 Conclusion
A new approach is proposed in this paper to study border control policies against COVID-19, or any
other epidemic, during the re-opening phase in an on-going pandemic. For this purpose, we develop
several model extensions, e.g. regarding border control and contact tracing. We calibrate the model
to the current COVID pandemics.
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Our main findings are as follows. We formally proof and illustrate by simulation that even per-
fectly efficient contact tracing does not allow to go back to normal life. Assuming a base reproduc-
tion (R0) rate of 2.8, the theoretically highest gain from contact tracing would be to achieve a realized
reproduction rate of 1.27. Even much smaller gains might be very helpful in relaxing alternative con-
tainment measures. Economically, this is of crucial importance because large parts of the observed
labor market slump can be traced back to these measures (e.g. Bauer and Weber, 2020). In line with
the intuition, the effects of opening up the borders to other countries depend on the foreign policies.
In a steady state situation, when the imported risk stays non-increasing, for countries with Rˆ < 1
opening up to other countries with Rˆ < 1, the virus stays in check. Opening the borders to countries
with Rˆ > 1 requires either border controls with strict testing at the border or mandatory quarantine
on arrival. Countries which have completely eliminated the virus (Rt ≈ 0 due to no domestic cases,
but Rˆ > 1) should impose mandatory quarantine to any country that have not eliminated domestic
spreading of the virus. Finally, the model provides a general framework, where model parameters
can also be estimated empirically.
While the present paper employs simulations based on parameter combinations from the existing
literature to analyze future pandemic scenarios, future research can easily fit the model to realized
corona data. Extending the model to have even more refined states is another possibility, e.g. if policy
makers are interested in differentiating between ”normal” hospitalization and treatment in intensive
care units, combined with appropriate capacity restrictions.
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